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CHARACTERIZATION OF EXPOSURE TO
AGENT ORANGE IN VIETNAM VETERANS
AS A BASIS FOR EPIDEMIOLOGICAL
STUDIES
Jeanne Mager Stellman, Ph.D. & Steven D. Stellman, Ph.D.,
M.P.H.∗
INTRODUCTION
Between 1961 and 1970, the U.S. military engaged in massive
chemical defoliation and crop destruction operations in Southeast
Asia.1 In 1985, nearly two decades after the spraying had ceased, a
landmark tort settlement was reached between a class of Vietnam
veterans and the chemical manufacturers that had supplied the
Agent Orange and other military herbicides to the U.S. Department
of Defense.2 It is notable that, at the time of the settlement, there
∗
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1
WILLIAM A. BUCKINGHAM, JR., OPERATION RANCH HAND: THE AIR
FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1961-1971 (Office of U.S. Air
Force History 1982).
2
In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y.
1985).
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was little convincing epidemiological evidence available, either
positive or negative, on the health consequences to veterans of the
herbicide operations. Today, more than three decades after this
massive environmental exposure, there is still a dearth of
epidemiological data on the extent to which adverse health
consequences resulted from the use, storage, and disposal of the
herbicides in Vietnam.
This paucity of epidemiological data stands in stark contrast to
the extensive amount of experimental data available on dioxin, an
important contaminant in about 60% of the herbicide sprayed.3
Much laboratory data convincingly demonstrate dioxin’s extreme
toxicity.4 The scientific literature also is growing with respect to
the carcinogenicity of the organic arsenical that was a primary
component of the Agent Blue used to destroy enemy food crops.5
Many epidemiological studies have been carried out on other,
much smaller populations exposed to the same chemicals. Indeed,
when the Institute of Medicine (IOM) conducts its biennial review
of the scientific literature and provides the Department of Veterans
3

The chemical composition of three major herbicides used in Vietnam and
the quantity dispersed are as follows:
Agent
Composition
Gallons
Agent Orange
2,4-D, 2,4,5-T*
12,066,840
Agent White
Picloram, 2,4-D
5,430,462
Agent Blue

Dimethylarsinic acid
1,252,541
(Synonym: Cacodylic acid)
*Contaminated with 2,3,7,8-TCDD (dioxin)
More detailed data are given in Jeanne Mager Stellman et al., The Extent and
Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in Vietnam, 422
NATURE 681 (2003) [hereinafter Stellman et al., The Extent and Patterns of
Usage of Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in Vietnam].
4
See, e.g., OFFICE OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NO. EPA/600/8-84/014F, HEALTH ASSESSMENT
DOCUMENT FOR POLYCHLORINATED DIBENZO-P-DIOXINS, FINAL REPORT (1985).
5
Hideki Wanibuchi et al., Carcinogenicity of an Organic Arsenical,
Dimethylarsinic Acid and Related Arsenicals in Rat Urinary Bladder, 40 PROC.
OF THE AM. ASS’N FOR CANCER RES. 349 (1999); Min Wei et al., Urinary
Bladder Carcinogenicity of Dimethylarsinic Acid in Male F344 Rats, 20
CARCINOGENESIS 1873 (1999).
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Affairs (VA) with a summary, including its appraisal of the
relationship between herbicide exposures and a list of health
outcomes, it relies to a large extent on studies carried out on nonveteran populations to support its conclusions.6 The degree to
which these other studies correctly estimate health effects in
Vietnam veterans is not known. Thus there continue to be practical
ramifications to the paucity of definitive epidemiological studies
on a sufficiently large exposed population of either veterans or
Vietnamese citizens.7
6

In accordance with the Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105
Stat. 11 (1991) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1116), the Committee to
Review the Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Herbicides was
asked “to determine (to the extent that available data permit meaningful
determinations)” the following regarding associations between specific health
outcomes and exposure to TCDD and other chemical compounds in herbicides:
A) whether a statistical association with herbicide exposure exists,
taking into account the strength of the scientific evidence and the
appropriateness of the statistical and epidemiological methods used to
detect the association; B) the increased risk of the disease among those
exposed to herbicides during service in the Republic of Vietnam during
the Vietnam era; and C) whether there exists a plausible biological
mechanism or other evidence of a causal relationship between herbicide
exposure and the disease.
38 U.S.C. § 1116. See COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE HEALTH EFFECTS IN
VIETNAM VETERANS OF EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: HEALTH EFFECTS OF HERBICIDES USED IN
VIETNAM (1994) [hereinafter 1994 IOM REPORT], available at http://books.nap.
edu/books/0309048877/html/index.html. The Institute of Medicine publishes
biennial updates based upon the deliberations of its Committee to Review the
Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Herbicides. The series is
VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE of which there are 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and
2004 publications.
7
Epidemiological studies can be used to support arguments that a disease
or dysfunction is more likely than not to have arisen from a particular causative
agent. Epidemiological studies examine the statistical distribution of a disease
(or other outcome) in two populations: one that was “exposed” to the agent or
condition under study and another “control” population not exposed and as alike
as possible in every other way to the exposed group. If the rate of disease
observed in the exposed population is greater than in the control population, and
if the rate differences satisfy certain statistical requirements, the rate difference
will be called “significant.”
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This article discusses some of the factors that have contributed
to the lack of epidemiological evidence on military herbicide
operations. Part I of this article will provide a brief overview of the
purposes and methodology of environmental epidemiological
studies. Part II will discuss the application of this methodology to
exposed Vietnam veterans. In particular, this section will examine
the use of exposure opportunity measures in epidemiological
studies as well as recent successful work on the development and
use of military records for estimating exposure opportunity to
military herbicides in Vietnam. This article concludes that while
there are sufficiently large populations available for study and
appropriate methodologies to carry out such studies, these muchneeded epidemiological investigations remain unfunded and
undone, so that both legal and public policy decisions must
continue to be made with inadequate scientific data.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL EPIDEMIOLOGY
A valid environmental epidemiology study relating an
exposure to subsequent risk of disease requires a biologically
reasonable hypothesis, an exposed population, and either an
unexposed population or a set of disease rates in a reference
population to which the rate of disease in the study group can be
compared. Usually there are experimental laboratory studies or
clinical reports of adverse health effects in individuals that can be
used to generate a “null” hypothesis of the form: “Exposure to
agent XYZ is not related to development of disease ABC.” The
purpose of the epidemiological study is to test the null hypothesis.
If the null hypothesis is rejected (i.e., a statistically significant
difference in rates is observed between the exposed and
unexposed), then the study is considered positive and a relationship
between the exposure and the outcome is supported.8
8

Note the use of the word “supported.” Epidemiological studies do not
establish cause and effect. Rather, they indicate that there is a statistical
likelihood that a relationship between the exposure and the outcome exists.
Generally, epidemiologists require a 95% certainty that the relationship is not
compatible with chance in order to consider an outcome significant. Failure to
meet this criterion is a type 1 error.
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A successful study of this nature requires a suitably large
population with sufficiently great exposure to agent XYZ to elicit
the measured health effect.9 Additionally, the population’s
exposure to the agent and the subsequent study must be adequately
spaced over time to have permitted XYZ an opportunity to induce
disease ABC. In fulfilling these requirements, epidemiological
studies must endeavor to identify all members of the at-risk
population, to successfully find and enroll these individuals in the
study, and to take into account other exposures (e.g., cigarette
smoking or occupational exposures) that also could lead to the
disease under study. It is also critically important that the exposed
population truly consist of exposed individuals. Many
environmental epidemiology studies have been compromised by
the inclusion of non-exposed individuals, for example, nonexposed clerical or management staff in a study of chemical plant
workers. Such dilution of a truly exposed population with
unexposed individuals is known as “differential misclassification”
of exposure and can result in an underestimate of the true
association between exposure and disease.10 There are many
instances of such misclassification errors in existing studies of
Vietnam veterans.11
In all cases, a necessity for the successful design and execution
of an environmental epidemiology study is the ability to define
“exposure.” Poorly defined population exposures can lead to two
9

The population size, the anticipated effect size (i.e. the environmental
agent’s potency as measured by the difference between the disease risk in the
exposed group and that in an unexposed reference group), and the desired level
of statistical certainty all contribute to the statistical “power” to actually observe
an effect if it is present. If there are too few exposed people or the effect size is
very small, an epidemiologic study may be useless and failure to reject the null
hypothesis (a negative result) non-informative. This is known as a type 2 error.
10
KENNETH J. ROTHMAN & SANDER GREENLAND, MODERN
EPIDEMIOLOGY 126-27 (1998).
11
JEANNE MAGER STELLMAN & STEVEN D. STELLMAN, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, SUBCONTRACT VA-5124-98-0019, CHARACTERIZING EXPOSURE OF
VETERANS TO AGENT ORANGE AND OTHER HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM: FINAL
REPORT 109 tbl.32 (2003) [hereinafter STELLMAN & STELLMAN,
CHARACTERIZING EXPOSURE OF VETERANS TO AGENT ORANGE AND OTHER
HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM].
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sources of misclassification error: unexposed people are
considered exposed or exposed people are considered not exposed.
Both types of error may occur in a given study and may lead to
unpredictable errors in estimates of exposure-disease associations.
For example, in the Air Force Health Study of Vietnam veterans
who were assigned to the herbicide spray operations, many in the
reference comparison group in fact had elevated blood levels of
dioxin, while many in the study population had non-detectable
levels.
Assigning exposure levels in epidemiology studies of chronic
exposures almost always poses great methodological challenges.12
Unlike “acute” exposures to an agent suspected of causing a health
effect (e.g., reactions to an implanted medical device or exposure
to environmental agents arising from industrial accidents or nonindustrial events, such as carbon monoxide poisoning from faulty
heaters), most chronic environmental exposures are characterized
by poor, incomplete, or even nonexistent measurements of actual
exposure levels. The “exposed” population may also have been
exposed to a host of other agents that could potentially cause the
same outcome and will have spent discontinuous—and usually
undocumented—periods of time being “exposed.” Studies are
often carried out years after the exposure has ended, making it
difficult, if not impossible, to find extant biological evidence of the
12

A valid metric for assigning exposures is a necessary element of an
epidemiology study—without it one cannot differentiate the exposed from the
controls. In addition, epidemiologists place higher confidence in studies that
demonstrate that the higher the dose of the exposure, the more likely the
outcome. For example, a cigarette smoker with a lifetime history of smoking one
pack per day, on average, has a relative risk of lung cancer eight to ten times that
of never-smokers, while a two pack per day smoker has a risk twenty times that
of a nonsmoker. Steven D. Stellman et al., Lung Cancer Risk in White and Black
Americans, 13 ANNALS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 294, 298 (2003). Thus, it is desirable
to have a metric that permits the exposure to be more than simply ever/never,
but rather quantified so that a dose-response relationship can be tested and the
risk at high doses compared with that at low doses. For a discussion of the
importance of dose-response relationships in epidemiological studies, see Leslie
Stayner et al., Sources of Uncertainty in Dose-Response Modeling of
Epidemiological Data for Cancer Risk Assessment, 895 ANNALS OF THE NEW
YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 212 (1999).
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exposure among individuals thought to have been exposed and, for
many environmental exposures, no adequate biomarkers exist.13
Ubiquitous environmental agents complicate the job of finding a
truly unexposed control population.
II. EPIDEMIOLOGY AND VIETNAM VETERANS
Whether the military use of herbicides in Vietnam lends itself
to the basic requirements for an environmental epidemiology study
merits examination. Such a study could test the following
generalized null hypothesis, “Exposure to military herbicides used
during the Vietnam War did not lead to adverse health outcomes
among the exposed populations or their offspring,” or a related,
more general hypothesis that “military service in areas sprayed by
military herbicides did not lead to adverse health outcomes.”
It is clear from the IOM’s summaries of available experimental
evidence that there exist sufficient toxicological and clinical data
to justify undertaking major epidemiology studies for a variety of
disease outcomes. In particular, the large quantity of herbicide that
the United States sprayed in Vietnam as well as the vast amounts
13

For many environmental agents, even if one had a scientifically valid
exposure metric, the extent of exposure might not yield a population that is large
enough for a successful epidemiological study to be carried out because the
number of exposed persons is small, the intensity of the exposures is low, or,
with the passage of time, the amount of chemical in exposed individuals’ bodies
declines due to metabolic processes. In any of these cases, the ability to detect
an association between exposure and disease is very limited, as expressed
numerically by the concept of statistical power. Statistical power is defined as
the probability that a statistical test will yield a significant result. JACOB COHEN,
STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1 (Academic
Press 1977). Thus, a weak environmental agent that does indeed cause a disease
(small effect size) would require a very large population N for the observed
difference in rates to reach significance. If a legal criterion demands an effect
size of a twofold difference between the exposed and non-exposed, the size of
the populations studied would also have to be expanded in relation to a criterion
which demanded a 50% increase (i.e. twofold relative risk). The necessary
population size for the study will also depend on the rate at which the disease is
observed in the unexposed population. Agents that cause rare diseases may be
less likely to be identified than those that cause common diseases because too
few cases ever occur to satisfy the requirements of statistical power.
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that it manufactured would provide epidemiological studies with a
sufficiently large sample of affected individuals and chemical
resources. Nearly 20 million gallons of military herbicides were
sprayed in Vietnam and Laos between 1961 and 1971. Agent
Orange accounted for more than 12 million gallons of these
herbicides. The chemical consists of a 50:50 mixture of two
phenoxyherbicides, 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, with much of the 2,4,5-T
component contaminated with dioxins and dibenzofurans. The
most notorious and deadly of these contaminants is 2,3,7,8tetrachloro-p-dibenodioxin, usually simply called dioxin, although
the precise levels of contamination are not known.14 These
chemicals are unwanted byproducts of the manufacturing process
and are inevitably present unless manufacturing conditions are
carefully controlled.15 Even prior to the 1985 Agent Orange tort
settlement, there was no question regarding dioxin’s deadly
effects.16
In order to proceed with an epidemiological study of Agent
Orange, there must be a suitable population available for study.
The authors have calculated that between 3 and 5 million
Vietnamese citizens were directly in the spray path of the
herbicide.17 Many areas, so-called “hotspots,” are still highly
contaminated with TCDD residues and a variety of bioassays have
found that Vietnamese individuals have higher-than-normal levels
of dioxin in their tissue,18 although there is little data on the
14

Stellman et al., The Extent and Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and
Other Herbicides in Vietnam, supra note 3, at 682.
15
ALASTAIR HAY, THE CHEMICAL SCYTHE: LESSONS OF 2,4,5-T AND
DIOXIN (Plenum Press 1982).
16
Indeed, in its decision with respect to the Agent Orange Class action, the
court stated:
As to the poisonous nature of dioxin and its ability to cause harm to
mammals, including homo sapiens, there is no doubt. The form of
dioxin implicated in Agent Orange is a dangerous, stable, long lasting
chemical. . . . Dioxin is one of the most powerful poisons known . . . .
In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 777 (E.D.N.Y.
1984).
17
Stellman et al., The Extent and Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and
Other Herbicides in Vietnam, supra note 3, at 684.
18
Arnold Schecter, Food As a Source of Dioxin Exposure in the Residents
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relationship between body burden and putative exposure. While
the precise number is not known, it is estimated that about 3
million American soldiers served in the Vietnam theatre.19 Soldiers
directly charged with carrying out the Air Force Operation Ranch
Hand, the name for the military operation that carried out the great
majority of aerial defoliation and crop destruction missions, were
potentially exposed to herbicides.20 Similarly, some, but certainly
not all, of those belonging to the Army Chemical Corps, another
group that has been studied, were also potentially were exposed. It
would be erroneous to classify all of these individuals as
potentially exposed.21 Some Army troops were herbicide handlers
or backpack sprayers, or were engaged in missions to keep base
camp perimeters free from vision-blocking foliage. There is
evidence that those whose missions brought them into recently
defoliated areas absorbed the herbicides.22 Finally, military unit
of Bien Hoa City, Vietnam, 45 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED., 781, 78182 (2003).
19
Sharon R. Cohany, The Vietnam-Era Cohort: Employment and Earnings,
115 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 3, 5 (1992).
20
The Air Force Health Study often called the Ranch Hand study, a 20year longitudinal study examining health, mortality, and reproductive outcomes,
has found associations between Ranch Hand service and subsequent risk of
prostate cancer and Type II diabetes. Matthew P. Longnecker & Joel E.
Michalek, Serum Dioxin Level in Relation to Diabetes Mellitus among Air Force
Veterans with Background Levels of Exposure, 11 EPIDEMIOLOGY 44 (2000).
This study, however, because of its unavoidably small size, is not informative on
rarer cancers.
21
Serum dioxin levels in the Air Force Health Study for the comparison
group reach a level nearly twice that of the Ranch Hand low category group in
the study population. See Akhtar et al., Cancer in US Air Force Veterans of the
Vietnam War, 46 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 123, 127 (2004). Some
Air Force personnel not directly assigned to the herbicide operational units did,
in fact, have work assignments that brought them into contact with herbicides,
while some flight personnel, notably pilots, who never handled herbicides, had
access to shower and laundry facilities and flew in air pressurized cabins. See
BUCKINGHAM, supra note 1 (providing an extensive history of the military
herbicide program in Vietnam). The exposure misclassification of the
comparison group as unexposed would, however, tend to strengthen our
confidence in the positive cancer findings. See supra note 20.
22
Peter C. Kahn et al., Dioxins and Dibenzofurans in Blood and Adipose
Tissue of Agent Orange-Exposed Vietnam Veterans and Matched Controls, 259
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history records show that a sufficiently large number of units were
directly sprayed during Operation Ranch Hand to justify largescale studies.23
The extent to which soldiers entering into previously sprayed
areas or living in base camps in which the perimeters were
regularly cleared with defoliants received a biologically significant
dose of herbicides or their contaminants is not clear. Because so
many years have passed since the exposure, measurement of the
current body burden of dioxin is subject to serious
misclassification errors, and biomarkers are not available for
herbicide formulations that were not contaminated with TCDD.24
JAMA 1661 (1988) (showing that the leaders of jungle patrols in heavily
sprayed areas, so-called “pointmen,” had elevated levels of dioxin compared to a
matched unexposed control population).
23
See STELLMAN & STELLMAN, CHARACTERIZING EXPOSURE OF VETERANS
TO AGENT ORANGE AND OTHER HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM, supra note 11, at 48
tbl.11. Table 11 demonstrates numerous documented instances in which combat
units were subject to “direct hits” from herbicide spray. The direct spraying of
combat units has been a contentious issue for several decades. The history of the
controversy is well described in the IOM’s 1994 report. Both the White House
Agent Orange Working Group and the Centers for Disease Control, Centers for
Disease Control Veterans Health Studies, Serum 2,3,7,8-Tetrachloro-PDibenzo-P-Dioxin Levels in U.S. Army Vietnam-Era Veterans, 260 JAMA 1249
(1988) [hereinafter CDC Veterans Health Studies], have declared that ground
troops were not exposed to herbicides and that only those troops with duties that
involved the handling and spraying operations were exposed. Examination of
military archives by the U.S. General Accounting Office, COMPTROLLER
GENERAL OF THE U.S., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. GROUND
TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WERE IN AREAS SPRAYED WITH HERBICIDE
ORANGE (1979), available at http://161.203.16.4/f0302/110930.pdf, and by the
CDC itself found a significant number of troops to have been located directly
under the spray path. Centers for Disease Control, AGENT ORANGE STUDY:
EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT: PROCEDURES AND STATISTICAL ISSUES (CDC Agent
Orange Project, Agent Orange Projects Interim Report, Draft, Feb. 1985).
24
The Institute of Medicine has specifically addressed the difficulties in
using current body burden measurements of dioxin to reflect past exposures in
Vietnam. First, during its oversight of the original CDC Agent Orange Study,
the IOM rejected the CDC proposal to “validate” military records of troop
location by using serum dioxin samples obtained at least two decades postexposure. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CDC STUDY OF THE HEALTH OF
VIETNAM VETERANS, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, FIFTH LETTER REPORT, REVIEW
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For these soldiers, service in an area with a history of herbicide
spraying would be the relevant measure of exposure (called an
“exposure opportunity index,” or EOI) rather than a measure of
biological dose. Such studies would seek to test the hypothesis that
military service in defoliated areas increased the risk that soldiers
would develop the diseases under study and that the risk was
proportional to the soldiers’ proximity in time and space to the
spraying.25
A. Agent Orange and Measures of Exposure
Methodological difficulties in assigning relative Agent Orange
COMPARISON OF SERUM LEVELS OF 2,3,7,8-TCDD WITH INDIRECT
ESTIMATES OF AGENT ORANGE EXPOSURE IN VIETNAM VETERANS (1987). The
CDC continued its “validation study” notwithstanding, CDC VETERANS HEALTH
STUDIES, supra, and, as a result of a purported lack of correlation between serum
dioxin and a records-based exposure index, abandoned the large Agent Orange
Study of III Corps Army combat battalions already underway. Agreeing with the
aforementioned IOM critique, a second IOM committee reviewed the conceptual
underpinnings of the CDC validation study, and, in contradistinction to the CDC
and Agent Orange Working Group conclusion, recommended that a study be
conducted on the utility of the historical reconstruction of military records for
characterizing exposure to military herbicides in Vietnam. See 1994 IOM
REPORT, supra note 6.
25
It should be noted that broad studies on the health of Vietnam veterans
are not informative with respect to the health effects of Agent Orange because of
serious misclassification errors that arise from considering the fact of service in
Vietnam to be equivalent to having served in a sprayed area. The large-scale
study undertaken by the Centers for Disease Control on the health of troops
assigned to Vietnam, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH STATUS OF VIETNAM VETERANS: VIETNAM
EXPERIENCE STUDY (1989) (Vols. I-V, Supplements A-C), for example, reveals
nothing about Agent Orange and other herbicides, nor was it the intent of the
study to address this issue. The same is true for the Selected Cancer Study. See
SELECTED CANCERS COOPERATIVE STUDY GROUP, ASS’N OF SELECTED
CANCERS WITH SERVICE IN THE U.S. MILITARY IN VIETNAM, II. SOFT-TISSUE
AND OTHER SARCOMAS, 150 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2485 (1990);
SELECTED CANCERS COOPERATIVE STUDY GROUP, ASS’N OF SELECTED
CANCERS WITH SERVICE IN THE U.S. MILITARY IN VIETNAM, III. HODGKIN’S
DISEASE, NASAL CANCER, NASOPHARYNGEAL CANCER, AND PRIMARY LIVER
CANCER, 150 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2495 (1990).
OF
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exposure levels to Vietnam veterans have been a major roadblock
to carrying out large-scale epidemiology studies of the relationship
between exposure to military herbicides and adverse health
outcomes. Indeed, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) and the Agent Orange Working Group, a subcommittee of
the White House Domestic Policy Council, declared that military
records could not be used to reconstruct past exposures, and the
CDC Agent Orange Study was abruptly halted, with unused funds
being returned to the Treasury.26
In 1994, however, the IOM again did not concur with the
federal scientists’ conclusions that any epidemiological study was
ipso facto impossible because of the inability to classify exposure
based on military records. The IOM recommended that a
methodological study be undertaken to determine whether methods
involving the historical reconstruction of military records could be
used for characterizing exposure to herbicides in Vietnam and as
the basis for epidemiology studies of Vietnam veteran health. The
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) subsequently received a
contract from the VA to seek independent researchers to develop
an appropriate methodology to conduct the investigation. The
exposure opportunity methodology described in this article is the
result of a subcontract from the NAS undertaken by the authors for
that purpose.27 In 1998, a project was begun to refine and validate
an EOI methodology that had previously been used in the exposure
assessment of claimants to the Agent Orange Veterans Payment
Program28 and in studies of Vietnamese citizens29 and American
26

The abandonment of the Agent Orange Study was the subject of
unsuccessful litigation by the American Legion and the Vietnam Veterans of
America, who sought to have the congressionally mandated study reinstated. See
American Legion v. Derwinski, 54 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1995); American Legion
v. Derwinski, 827 F. Supp. 805 (D.D.C. 1993).
27
See 1994 IOM REPORT, supra note 6; COMMITTEE ON THE ASSESSMENT
OF WARTIME EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
CHARACTERIZING EXPOSURE OF VETERANS TO AGENT ORANGE AND OTHER
HERBICIDES USED IN VIETNAM: SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING A
REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS FOR RESEARCH (1997).
28
The original methodology was the basis for assessing exposure eligibility
for the Agent Orange Veterans Payment Program, established in the Agent
Orange class action settlement. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.
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Vietnam veterans.30
EOI models, which are becoming increasingly common in
epidemiological studies, typically represent exposure as a function
of proximity in time and space to a toxic agent.31 An EOI is often
used, for example, in occupational or environmental studies as a
surrogate estimator of historical exposure where current
environmental or biomarker measurements are inadequate
estimators of past exposures and where measurements were never
made in the past or are unavailable.32 The EOI concept is
complementary to traditional exposure methodologies based upon
toxicological models and measures. Exposure opportunity is not in
itself a toxicological measure, but EOI scores can be incorporated
into toxicological models as “presentation” dosages. Such dosages
are intended for use in large-scale studies in which a location
history is the principal source of information about an individual or
group, such as a military unit. These models are especially
applicable to studies in which body burden measurements are
impractical or unlikely to reflect exposures in the distant past.
To perfect an EOI model for military herbicides in Vietnam, a
Geographical Information System (GIS) for the former Republic of
Vietnam was created. The GIS is a relational database whose
Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
29
Marie-Catherine Ha et al., Agent Orange and the Risk of Gestational
Trophoblastic Disease in Vietnam, 51 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 368 (1996).
30
A cross-sectional study of American Legionnaires utilized an earlier
version of the EOI methods described here. See Steven D. Stellman & Jeanne
Mager Stellman, Estimation of Exposure to Agent Orange and Other Defoliants
Among American Troops in Vietnam: A Methodological Approach, 9 AM. J.
INDUS. MED. 305 (1986), for the methodology and Steven D. Stellman et al.,
Combat and Herbicide Exposure in Vietnam Among American Legionnaires, 47
ENVTL. RESEARCH 112, 120-21 (1988), for the distribution of EOIs in the
cohort.
31
See, e.g., Kirk R. Smith, Place Makes the Poison: Wesolowski Award
Lecture – 1999, 12 J. EXPOSURE ANALYSIS. & ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 167
(2002); Mary H. Ward et al., Identifying Populations Potentially Exposed to
Agricultural Pesticides Using Remote Sensing and a Geographic Information
System, 108 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 5 (2000).
32
See, e.g., E. S. Schaeffner et al., Use of an Asbestos Exposure Score and
the Presence of Pleural and Parenchymal Abnormalities in a Lung Cancer Case
Series, 7 INT’L J. OF OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 14 (2001).
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component tables (the “layers”) contain data on herbicide
application, military troop location, and other geographically
encoded data resources that are designed to be utilized in the
assessment of exposure to herbicides and exposure-related health
risks for specific populations. Table 1 contains an abbreviated list
of data layers that are currently included in the GIS.33 The GIS is
built around two interrelated concepts: the partitioning of Vietnam
into 0.01° x 0.01° “square” grids and the association of the
geographic center of each grid with a continuous EOI and a vector
of four proximity “hit” scores.34 Data in each layer have been
geocoded in a manner compatible with our Vietnam grid system.
Unique grid identifiers serve to link data between cartographic
layers.

33

Adapted from Jeanne Mager Stellman et al., A Geographic Information
System for Characterizing Exposure to Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in
Vietnam, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 321, 322 (2003).
34
The EOI takes into account entry into areas sprayed in the past as well as
being present during an actual spray mission. A conservative first-order decay
model is used to simulate the decay of herbicide in the environment. The term
“hit” is applied when an individual actually was located in or near the spray path
during a mission. The mathematical representations of these two models are
given in Steven D. Stellman & Jeanne Mager Stellman, Exposure Opportunity
Models for Agent Orange, Dioxin, and Other Military Herbicides Used in
Vietnam, 1961-1971, 14 J. EXPOSURE, ANALYSIS & ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 354
(2004).
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Table 1. GIS data tables (“layers”) of location and herbicide
spray data that can be linked to create exposure opportunity
scores.35
Type of activity or
Examples
data
HERBS file
Flight paths and other details of herbicide
spray applications
Civilian habitations
Cities, towns, villages, hamlets, plantations
Vietnam land and
Soil typology, land topography, rivers,
water features
streams
Civil structures
Roadways, utility lines, rail lines, canals,
air fields
Military structures
Military bases, base camps, landing zones,
air fields
Troop locations
Headquarters, base camps, depots, and
other locations assigned to support and
combat support units; tracked locations for
combat troops
Operation Ranch
Specific areas designated for defoliation
Hand Targets
and crop destruction by an elaborate
approval mechanism
Herbicide storage,
Locations of known “incidents” such as
transport, and
spills, dumps, and crashes
unplanned dispersal
At the heart of exposure assessment is a comprehensive
database, known as the HERBS file, that describes all documented
herbicide applications that were carried out by the U.S. military
during the Vietnam War. This database was compiled from a wide
variety of archival sources under a contract from the NAS. The
HERBS file contains information consisting of one or more
records that collectively describe the spray coordinates of single or
multiple aircraft (known as sorties) during 9,141 missions. The
majority of spray (about 18 million gallons) was applied by
specially equipped C-123 transport aircraft in Operation Ranch
Hand. The chief herbicide uses were defoliation and crop
35

See Stellman et al., supra note 33, for more details.
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destruction. During the work undertaken for the NAS, the HERBS
file was extensively corrected and validated.36 U.S. Army (not Air
Force) personnel sprayed tens of thousands of gallons along base
camp perimeters, waterways, and communication lines by
helicopter, backpack, truck, and boat. Each of these modalities was
calibrated to spray the phenoxyherbicides at a rate of 3 gallons per
acre. A large percentage of these missions were entered into a
second HERBS file, sometimes called the Services-HERBS. A
major data cleaning and reconciliation effort was undertaken to
eliminate redundancies in these two files, and the current version
of the HERBS file contained in the GIS reflects those quality
control changes.
More than 98% of all herbicide spraying was by fixed-wing
aircraft. Key to the usefulness of the HERBS file is the fact that it
describes the actual flight paths taken by the Ranch Hand aircraft.
For example, the HERBS file contains “leg designators” that
permit the reconstruction of the contiguous flight paths of 5,215
fixed-wing Ranch Hand missions, most with multiple sorties.
Although the GIS is a useful tool for visualizing locations of
individuals or military units in relation to herbicide applications,
the sheer quantity of data in both the herbicide and unit location
databases and the almost limitless possibilities for temporal and
spatial variation make calculation of exposure opportunity scores a
formidable challenge. To reduce this task to manageable
proportions, a user-friendly software system called Herbicide
Exposure Assessment – Vietnam (HEA-V) was created.37 The
software accepts as input a “location history” database in
Microsoft Excel or Access format and produces as output a set of
“hits” scores and the EOI score for each input record. The input
may pertain equally to a specific military unit that traveled from
one place to another or to an individual who belonged to that unit.
It may also pertain to a fixed location, such as a village, hamlet, or
36

Details of the process whereby the HERBS file was corrected are given
in STELLMAN & STELLMAN, CHARACTERIZING EXPOSURE OF VETERANS TO
AGENT ORANGE AND OTHER HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM, supra note 11, at 5-7.
37
Stellman & Greene Consulting, Herbicide Exposure AssessmentVietnam (HEA-V), software manual and appendices (Brooklyn, N.Y., Found.
for Worker, Veteran and Envtl. Health, Inc. 2003) (on file with author).
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other geographical entity. It is thus equally suited for use in both
epidemiological and ecological studies.
B. Military Unit Location Database Core Data Layer
In the course of providing exposure analyses for the Agent
Orange Veterans Payment Program (AOVPP), a database was
compiled (at the battalion level) reflecting those locations at which
AOVPP claimants were stationed. Further troop location data for
all Army combat support units assigned to Vietnam have now been
compiled from a variety of primary and secondary military
sources.38 Through a Freedom of Information Act request, the
Special Master to the AOVPP obtained data files that contained the
locations of many Army combat military units. The files had been
created in the course of the CDC’s aforementioned abandoned
Agent Orange Study. The data were compiled by the Department
of Defense Environmental Support Group, which had identified
and tracked more than sixty combat battalions stationed in the III
Corps Tactical Zone, a very heavily sprayed region extending from
the southern coast of Vietnam to the Cambodian border and
including Saigon. The Support Group tracked the daily activities
and locations of individual companies in these battalions between
1967 and 1969 utilizing a wide variety of data sources, such as
daily journals and ORLLs (Operations Reports and Lessons
Learned). These data have now been updated and extensively
“cleaned” to remove obvious typographical errors; the GIS now
38

In general, approximately five out of six troops serve in such support
units, which we call “stable” units because troops are stationed at specific base
camps and are not required to move frequently. The ratio in Vietnam appears to
have been lower, with proportionately more troops assigned to combat. There
were more than 1,650 “stable” Army units, which together had an average
authorized troop strength of just under 200,000. Nearly 1,000 additional units,
whose authorized total troop strength was about 162,000, were also largely
stationary but had “mobile elements” who routinely left base camps to carry out
their missions. These units included Aviation, Engineering, Ordnance, Signal,
Transportation, and Medical Corps and Military Police. The stable units
provided support for more than 400 highly mobile units, such as Infantry,
Armor, Cavalry, and Artillery battalions, whose strength averaged more than
120,606.
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contains detailed location data for sixty-three combat battalions for
the time period between 1967 and 1969.39 In addition, nonexhaustive databases for the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marines
also have been compiled.40
With knowledge of the unit to which an individual was
assigned and the individual’s dates of assignment, it is thus
possible to link the individual to various locations over time. These
locations and dates then become input data for the exposure
opportunity calculations. Thus, for any given location, military
unit, or individual, researchers can calculate an EOI as a
quantitative spatio-temporal representation of that individual’s
proximity to a toxic agent. The EOI model takes into account three
independent factors that determine an individual’s exposure:
concentration of the toxicologically active substance, distance from
the spray application, and the time during which the exposure may
have taken place. Details of this exposure methodology have been
published.41
Extensive calculations have been carried out to validate EOI
measurements. Those locations at which military units were found
to have high EOI scores coincide closely with the “hot spots”
indicated in EOI surface plots of Vietnam. The log-normal
distributions of exposure scores, especially those that show
39

The CDC had asserted that these extracted files contained location gaps
that invalidate them as a data source for epidemiological studies. The data
cleaning carried out during the course of our research found many gaps to be the
result of clerical error rather than missing data and that sufficient data are
available to construct study populations of a size suitable for valid
epidemiological studies.
40
Exposure estimation for these branches of the military is usually simpler
because, for example, most Naval units (with known exceptions such as
Riverine units) were located offshore and thus had no opportunity for exposure.
In addition, there were a limited number of Air Force installations and the
Marines belonged to a comparatively small number of units, mostly assigned to
I Corps (the northern region) in comparatively restricted areas.
41
See Jeanne Mager Stellman et al., A Geographic Information System for
Characterizing Exposure to Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in Vietnam,
supra note 33; Steven D. Stellman & Jeanne Mager Stellman, Exposure
Opportunity Models for Agent Orange, Dioxin, and Other Military Herbicides
Used in Vietnam, supra note 34.

STELLMAN MACROED CORRECTED 070505.DOC

7/5/2005 2:37 PM

EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES AND AGENT ORANGE 523
systematically higher exposure for the combat units whose
locations were in the heavily sprayed areas of III Corps described
above, indicate both face and content validity.
Two studies have compared the EOIs calculated in the GIS
with serum dioxin. These comparisons provide an objective
measure of body burden when samples are taken sufficiently close
in time to the exposure event and when the kinetics of metabolism
are taken into account. In 1989, Dr. Sylvaine Cordier of France’s
National Institute of Health and Medical Research (INSERM)
requested that the authors help evaluate exposures for a series of
twenty-seven patients admitted for abdominal surgery to the Cho
Ray Hospital in Ho Chi Minh City, for whom adipose tissue was
being collected for subsequent dioxin assay. EOIs were estimated
through our then-current algorithms using the subjects’ residential
locations. Five patients’ levels were at background. For the
remaining twenty-two patients, the Pearson correlation
coefficient42 was 0.50 for association between the log of serum
dioxin and the log of the EOI.43 The second biomarker study was a
pilot project that was part of a collaboration between the authors
and the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC),
which had carried out a case-control study of non-Hodgkin’s
lymphoma and soft tissue sarcomas in Vietnamese civilians in Ho
Chi Minh City between 1993 and 1996.44 This study also produced
a significant correlation.
Apart from this quantitative validation, a qualitative
concordance has been observed between extremely high dioxin
concentrations in samples of soil taken at an abandoned U.S. air
42

The Pearson correlation coefficient is a measure of association between
two variables. Its value ranges from -1 to +1. A zero coefficient indicates no
association, while a ±1 is either a perfectly direct or perfectly inverse
relationship. Squaring the correlation coefficient approximates the degree of
variation “explained” by the association. A statistically significant correlation of
0.50 is generally considered strong in environmental studies.
43
Pierre Verger et al., Correlation between Dioxin Levels in Adipose Tissue
and Estimated Exposure to Agent Orange in South Vietnamese Residents, 65
ENVTL. RES. 226 (1994).
44
Eva Kramarova et al., Exposure to Agent Orange and Occurrence of
Soft-Tissue Sarcomas or Non-Hodgkin Lymphomas: An Ongoing Study in
Vietnam, 106 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 671, 671 (1998).
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base in the Ashau Valley45 and the HERBS file locations of
sprayings of Agent Purple at the same location. Agent Purple was
an early herbicide with a dioxin contamination level estimated at
10 to 100 times that of Agent Orange.46
CONCLUSION
In its review of the methodological work on the GIS described
in this article, the IOM confirmed that the exposure opportunity
methodology and the resulting GIS system made epidemiological
studies possible and, moreover, urged that epidemiological studies
be undertaken immediately.47 The editors of Nature similarly
agreed that the work on the GIS and on the revised inventory of
spraying (the HERBS file) enabled the performance of urgently
needed studies on the effects of Agent Orange.48
45

L. Wayne Dwernychuk et al., Dioxin Reservoirs in Southern Viet Nam: A
Legacy of Agent Orange, 47 CHEMOSPHERE 117, 121 (2002).
46
Recently the possibility that the elevated dioxin could be attributed to
storage of herbicide at Special Forces base was raised. See L. Wayne
Dwernychuk, Dioxin Hotspots in Vietnam, CHEMOSPHERE (forthcoming). This is
highly unlikely since operational records specifically state that all defoliation
was to be carried out by C-123 spray mission because tree height made hand
spraying impractical and the loading of spray planes is documented to have
taken place at Tan Son Nhut Air Force base and not at the camp itself. The camp
was only in operation for a relatively brief period of time because it proved to be
ineffective against the Viet Cong insurgency, thus making it likely that
documentation of spraying is complete. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
RECORDS OF THE U.S. FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY
ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM (MACV), ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR
OPERATIONS (J3), CHEMICAL OPERATIONS DIVISION (MACJ-3–09). Herbicide
Operations Plans (1966–1967) series, Record Group 472 (National Archives
and Records Administration, College Park, MD; 1950–75).
47
COMMITTEE ON THE ASSESSMENT OF WARTIME EXPOSURE TO
HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CHARACTERIZING EXPOSURE
OF VETERANS TO AGENT ORANGE AND OTHER HERBICIDES USED IN VIETNAM:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (National Academy of Sciences Press,
Washington, D.C., 2003).
48
Some of the work reported here appeared as a cover article in Nature,
which was accompanied by the following legend: “[T]his work has provided a
geographic information system that will allow epidemiologists to piece together
health effects that may exist in the region as they now have a much clearer idea
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It is of interest that the work undertaken on behalf of the NAS
built upon the exposure methodologies adopted by the Special
Master for the Agent Orange Veterans Payment Program as a
means for determining whether a deceased or disabled claimant
met the court-established criteria for exposure. The court had
reasoned that the NAS previously had considered the HERBS file
to be a unique and valid source of specific information on the
military spraying49 and that “geographic and temporal limits must
be set to determine whether a veteran who was in a location near a
sprayed area at or subsequent to the time of spraying will be
considered exposed.”50 This reasoning has now been affirmed by
the IOM.
The IOM recommendations were strongly endorsed with
bipartisan support by both the House and Senate Veterans Affairs
Committees, which requested that the VA initiate such studies
immediately.51 The VA responded that the studies were still
premature, but that “in-house” validation studies would be carried
out.52 Such an internal study by the VA is, in fact, explicitly
disallowed by the Agent Orange Act of 1991, which sought to
avoid potential conflicts of interest by mandating that a major
epidemiological study be carried out by non-governmental
researchers. Further correspondence from the VA to the American
Legion53 at the time of this writing indicates that the VA has taken
no further steps to launch an external investigation and plans to
continue with its internal studies until at least 2007.
about the distribution of the agents (and dioxin) and about the ‘hot spots.’”
49
COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECTS OF HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EFFECTS OF HERBICIDES IN SOUTH VIETNAM; PART A.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS (National Academy of Sciences Press,
Washington, D.C., 1974).
50
In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396, 1417
(E.D.N.Y. 1985).
51
Letter from U.S. Congress House and Senate Veterans’ Affairs
Committees to Honorable Anthony Principi (Nov. 24, 2003) (on file with
author).
52
Letter from Honorable Anthony Principi to U.S. Congress House and
Veterans Affairs Committees (Dec. 18, 2003) (on file with author).
53
Letter from Jonathan B. Perlin, Acting Undersecretary for Health, Dep’t
of Veterans Affairs, to John Sommer (Nov. 12, 2004) (on file with author).

